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aBlackRock, 400 Howard St, San Francisco, CA 94105, USAAbstractCentral bank surveys indicate that the use of electronic brokerage systems account for the great majority of inter-dealer spot foreign exchange
market trade execution. This share has grown from zero in the early 1990s and is up sharply from that reported in the surveys taken in 1998.
While the surveys point out the rapid growth of electronic brokers as an important FX institution, there has been no research on the micro-
structure issues that lead traders to choose electronic brokerage (EB) over the historically dominant, and still quite relevant, institution of direct
dealing where bilateral conversations (either telephone or electronic) occur between two FX traders and a deal is struck. We provide analysis to
further our understanding of the choice of trading venue in foreign exchange.
Theory suggests that the choice of trading venue will differ for “large” and “small” traders. This is due to the importance of asymmetric
information, transaction costs, and speed of execution. The most likely outcome has direct dealing used for large trades while the EB is used for
small trades.
The empirical analysis utilizes data on orders submitted to the Reuters EB system. We focus on the duration of time between order sub-
mission and finding a match for trade execution. An autoregressive conditional duration (ACD) model is specified using the Burr distribution.
Given the price competitiveness of an order, duration is increasing in order size. Because of this longer duration for large orders on the EB, large
traders will prefer the direct dealing market to the brokerage. We also find that the greater the depth of the market, the shorter the duration of
orders of all sizes. This result is consistent with traders clustering in time to submit orders so as to increase the probability of finding a match.
Copyright  2013, Borsa _Istanbul Anonim Şirketi. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
One of the most dramatic shifts in the market structure of
international financial markets has been the rise in the use of
electronic brokerages to trade currencies. From a base of zero
with their introduction in 1992, electronic brokers have risen
to about 62 percent of spot market volume according to the* Corresponding author.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bir.2013.10.005Bank of England survey of April 2013. This is up from about
30 percent in 1998.1 While the recent survey points out the
importance of electronic brokers as an institution, there has
been very little research to date on the microstructure issues
that lead traders to choose electronic brokerage over the his-
torically dominant, and still quite relevant, institution of direct
dealing where bilateral conversations (either telephone or
electronic) occur between two traders and a deal is struck.
While this paper focuses on trader strategies faced with the
choice of direct dealing or electronic brokerage, there are
broader implications of the presence of the brokerage relevant1 A comprehensive review of electronic currency brokers is provided by
Rime (2003).
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discovery and liquidity provision. FX has been a very opaque
market where only the two parties to a deal know what was
done. Electronic brokerage now permits participants to view
streaming prices in terms of the best bid and ask and allows
inference on prices of completed deals in real time (but not
quantities). Transparency has increased in FX. Furthermore,
since agents do not reveal their identity until a deal is struck,
the brokerage levels the playing field across market partici-
pants in a market where, historically, there have been tiers of
banks based upon size and market power. This democratiza-
tion and enhanced information flow is an important product of
the development of electronic brokerages in foreign exchange.
We seek to analyze electronic brokerage as an alternative to
bilateral direct dealing in order to further our understanding
regarding the choice of trading venue in foreign exchange. The
paper is divided into four parts. Following the introduction,
theory is briefly reviewed in Section 2 that relates to the choice
of trading venue. Section 3 presents an empirical analysis
utilizing data from the Reuters 2000-2 electronic brokerage
system. The analysis focuses on the duration of the time be-
tween submitting an order and finding a match and a trade. An
autoregressive conditional duration (ACD) model is specified
using the Burr distribution rather than the usual exponential
distribution assumed for the residual. The gain is that of
moving from a flat, constant hazard function of the exponen-
tial ACD to a non-monotonic hazard of the Burr ACD that
allows the hazard to vary with duration time. The estimation
results support the Burr functional form over the more com-
mon exponential or less common Weibull ACD models. In
terms of the testable hypotheses suggested by the theory of
Section 2, we find that it is important to condition inference on
price competitiveness of orders. Given the price competitive-
ness of an order, duration is increasing in order size and
decreasing in market depth. Finally, Section 4 offers a sum-
mary and concluding discussion.
2. Choice of trading venue: theory
The direct dealership market and the electronic brokerage
provide two trading venues competing for order flow in the
inter-dealer foreign exchange market. An important benefit
provided by the electronic brokerage is the lower transaction
cost relative to the market-making dealer’s bid-ask spread. A
disadvantage is the lack of assurance of an immediate
execution of transactions. So the transaction cost and imme-
diacy of execution are the two key issues to be taken into
account when a trader decides where to trade. In this section,
we review a few models that have relevance for such multi-
market trading opportunities and the associated trader’s
choice problem. We can relate the theoretical results to some
of the stylized facts of foreign exchange trading.2.1. a. Theoretical motivation2 For examples see Katz and Shapiro (1985), Pagano (1989), Chowdhry and
Nanda (1991), Glosten (1994), Parlour and Seppi (2003), and Hendershott and
Mendelson (2000).In equity trading, a literature has developed that addresses
the choice of trading through a specialist or on an electroniccrossing network (ECN).2 There are significant differences
between the equity trading environment and that for foreign
exchange. The crossing networks for equity trading are part of
a larger market with a great deal of transparency as trades are
public information. However, the foreign exchange market,
broadly speaking, is characterized by low transparency as the
direct-dealing market generates proprietary information and
the rest of the market does not know prices or quantities
traded. The greater transparency provided by the foreign ex-
change electronic brokerages is one of the attractions of their
use. The study by Viswanathan and Wang (2004) is relevant
here as they compare theoretical models of a traditional dealer
market and a multi-stage trading mechanism similar to an
electronic limit order book and show that the adverse selection
problem is lowered with the order book. This is analogous to
an advantage associated with the electronic brokerage in
foreign exchange and may be related to the popularity of
trading on this platform.
Aside from the finance literature dealing specifically with
equity markets, there is a more general theoretical literature
that provides background and motivation for the choice of
trading venue. A brief overview of a small selection of these
papers will provide the flavor of the approach.
Gehrig (1993) examines the problem of a world where an
intermediary makes bid and offer prices to buyers and sellers
and coordinates their trade desires. Alternatively, the buyers
and sellers can search without the intermediary for a match.
There is no asymmetric information that motivates the pres-
ence of the intermediary, rather it is the ability of agents who
have the most to gain by trading quickly to benefit from the
use of the intermediary, paying a price to the intermediary for
this benefit. So the intermediary provides greater certainty of
execution at a favorable price than the disaggregated search
process. In currency trading, an agent uses a market-making
dealer for immediacy so that a certain price accompanies
immediate execution.
Spulber (1996) presents a model where time is a kind of
transaction cost as buyers and sellers discount future returns
by the time expected to find a better price. This results in
buyers paying a higher price or sellers receiving a lower price
for an immediate trade than could be found with a complete
search. The higher the discount rate, the greater the incentive
to trade quickly rather than participate in further search across
intermediaries for a better price. Agents differ in their reser-
vation prices so that the greater the willingness to pay, the less
time spent searching. In terms of the present paper, we expect
that agents with large amounts to trade will expect a longer
time for their order to fill on the electronic brokerage and so
will view the dealer as a better alternative.
Fingleton (1997) develops a model that has qualitative
features much like the foreign exchange market under
4 Grammig and Maurer (2000) found that the hazard functions for 5 large
stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange were increasing in duration as
duration increased from zero and then were decreasing in duration over the
remainder of duration values. Based upon this finding, they argue that flexible
hazard function specification is critical in successful duration models of
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liquidity and is always ready to trade at either side of the
market like the foreign exchange market-making dealer. Then
there also exists a “direct trade” market where a centralized
coordinator matches buyers and sellers bilaterally for a fee
using their reported reservation prices to determine a market
clearing price. This is similar to the electronic brokerage in
foreign exchange where agents submit limit orders and are
matched via the automated matching algorithm. In this model,
agents with higher valuations go to the dealer while agents
with lower valuations go to the direct trading platform. In
addition, as the probability of finding a match in the direct
trading market falls, the dealer becomes more attractive as a
counterparty.
Foucault (1999) models execution risk as the probability of
a limit order not being executed at all possible prices. When
execution risk is high, his traders are led to seek immediate
execution upon arrival to the market. Conversely, when
execution risk is low, traders are more patient and wait for a
match. Price volatility is another feature of the Foucault model
where the limit order fill rate decreases with asset price
volatility due to agents submitting less attractive limit prices
due to concern over being “picked off” at an unfavorable
price. Such volatility is related to the depth of the market,
where the deeper the market, the less important this adverse
selection or “winner’s curse” problem. This motivates a
concern with the time-varying liquidity of the electronic
brokerage so that one expects the duration of a limit order
(time to find a match) to be a function of depth of the order
book.
We do not intend to provide an exhaustive review of the
related literature, but one can see clear parallels between
existing theory and the issues of interest. The models
mentioned above provide results that suggest interesting issues
to explore empirically. Our focus is on limit orders submitted
to the electronic brokerage (EB) so that the duration between
order submission and execution is an important consideration.3
Traders would take into account the potential delay until a
match is found on the EB by discounting the value of trading
by some factor. After a trader submits his order to the EB, it
may take some time to find a match. Duration is used to
measure the “waiting time” on the EB and is the time between
order submission and order execution for a filled order. For a
failed order, it is the time between order entry and order
removal. The expected duration for small traders should be
less than for large traders. We will test this proposition in the
empirical section below. In particular, we estimate the condi-
tional hazard function as a function of order size. Conditional3 While market orders are executed immediately at the best price, there are
related issues involving large and small orders for market order strategy. A
large trade is likely to exhaust the limit orders with priority so that the order
then trades at worse prices as the order is filled down the order book. So while
market orders provide immediacy, since traders do not know what lies behind
the best price, large market orders face price uncertainty relative to small
market orders.on all available past information (all past duration times), the
conditional hazard function measures the rate at which order
durations are completed (matches are found and trades
executed) after ti1, given that the order exists at ti1. In other
words, the conditional hazard function gives the expected
number of trades in the next time interval greater than ti1
given that orders have been submitted to the EB at ti1. Since
it takes several small orders on the other side of the market to
fill one large order, we may expect the hazard rate for a large
order, with duration tl, to be lower than that for small orders,
with duration ts. However, this is really an empirical question
as it is possible to observe hazard functions under reasonable
parameterizations where the value of the hazard function is
increasing in duration for a certain range.4 Such hazard
functions have the hazard increasing in small durations and
decreasing in large durations. Given the possibility of such a
hazard for trade on the EB, it is not possible to state, a priori,
that large orders will have a smaller hazard than small orders.
So even if large and small traders face the same hazard
functions, the incidence of expected trades for large orders in
the next time period could, theoretically, be smaller or larger
than that for small orders. Our empirical work below will yield
evidence on this issue.2.2. b. Stylized facts
2.2.1. Size effect
One stylized fact in foreign exchange is that large traders
tend to trade with market-making dealers while small traders
go to the EB. Within the context of the models discussed
above, we now discuss this fact.
2.2.2. Value from trading
Traders with higher valuations are more likely to trade via
direct dealing with market makers (DD). Why might large
traders have a higher trade valuation? Survey evidence has
suggested that large traders are thought to possess private
information about the value of the underlying asset, which,
may yield a higher value from trading.5 If informed traders are
more likely to use DD rather than EB, then one would expect
that the composition of informed and uninformed traders willfinancial markets.
5 Cheung and Chinn (2001) report that surveyed foreign exchange dealers
identify a competitive advantage to large traders stemming from their large
customer base which provides better information on the order flow in the
market. Gehrig and Menkhoff (2004) also provide survey evidence on the role
of order flow while Lyons (2001) provides a good overview of the topic and
points out that large orders may have persistent price effects due to a portfolio-
balance effect associated with the less than perfect substitutability across as-
sets with different currency denominations (p. 32). A rapidly growing litera-
ture on order flow includes Evans and Lyons (2002), and Killeen, Lyons, and
Moore (2006).
6 Their major findings were that indicative returns lagged the EB returns and
were more volatile and more autocorrelated and, unlike the EB spreads,
indicative spreads contained no information on liquidity.
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mation, it could be that the large trader is more risk averse so
that a quick trade is strongly preferred to the uncertainty of
the EB.
2.2.3. Probability of execution
As mentioned earlier, the probability of execution is likely
to be different for the small traders and the large trader. This is
simply because it is more difficult for a large order to find a
match on the EB. Since the expected payoff on the EB will (at
least, implicitly) include a discount factor for duration, then
the large trader gets a smaller expected payoff value from
trading on the EB than small traders. A corollary is that the
transaction cost on the EB has to be lower to attract a large
trader than to attract a small trader.
2.2.4. Failure of EB in high volatility periods
Another stylized fact about foreign exchange trading is that
direct dealing seems to be preferred when exchange rate
volatility is high. One striking result of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York survey on the impact of electronic broking
in foreign exchange was the chief dealers’ belief that “main-
taining a viable interbank direct dealing market was prudent to
ensure sufficient liquidity to handle large trades during periods
of stress” (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 1997, p. 6).
The survey indicated that electronic broking systems were
much less satisfactory for trading during periods of high
volatility. In some extreme situations the EB may fail to attract
a sufficient number of traders, so that it “dries up” in times of
great uncertainty associated with high volatility. Price vola-
tility might affect several variables in our model, such as the
discount factor and transaction costs at both markets, thus
changing the traders’ behavior at the equilibrium. Since a long
historical database of electronic brokerage activity is unavai-
lable at this time, volatility effects are beyond the scope of this
paper. However, as longer data sets, encompassing high
volatility events, become available we hope to be able to
address this issue.
Since it takes time for orders on the EB to be executed,
there is a potential loss caused by price movement during the
duration that an order sits without a match. This potential loss
is due to an unfavorable exchange rate movement between
the time an order is entered and the time the order is filled if
the agent is unable to cancel the order before execution. This
is a type of winner’s curse, where a limit order is “picked-
off” at a now-stale price in a fast-changing market. In times
of high volatility, there is a higher probability of such an
outcome.
3. Empirical analysis
The theoretical models reviewed in the previous section are
used to motivate the empirical work that follows. In particular,
the model generates testable hypotheses regarding the duration
time of submitted orders on the EB and the probability of
execution. We first describe the data set used for analysis andthen turn to a description of the econometric methods
employed before presenting estimation results.3.1. a. Data descriptionThe data analyzed are Reuters D2000-2 electronic
brokerage data on the Mark/Dollar exchange rate. The data set
covers one week: October 6e10, 1997, and contains infor-
mation on 130,535 orders. The data are described and
analyzed in detail in Danielsson and Payne (2002). This was
an important paper as these two authors used the EB data set to
show how firm tradable prices as available on the EB differ
from the indicative quotes that were popular for most of the
early FX microstructure studies.6 Our data include both limit
orders and market orders. The following information about an
order is available: type of order (market or limit); order date,
entry and exit time; order removal codes for filled and
canceled orders; price; quantity ordered; and quantity dealt.
Reuters D2000-2 operates as an electronic limit order book
with liquidity supply via limit order and liquidity demand via
market order. While the data set is getting old, it is unique in
that it allows an analysis of the FX market in a manner not
possible with any other exchange rate data set. Specifically, the
data contain information not available to market participants
since we can observe unexecuted orders submitted to the
system. Real-time participants just see the inside spread quotes
but not the limit order book. Table 1 provides some descriptive
statistics for the original data. Table 1a shows that the average
price of an order was 1.75144 marks per dollar and the average
order size was 2.283058 million dollars. The average quantity
dealt was 0.883633 million, reflecting the fact that many or-
ders are not filled and are withdrawn with no matching
counterparty or are only partially filled. Table 1d and e pro-
vides additional information in that 63,517 orders were suc-
cessful in finding a counterparty and 67,018 were withdrawn
before a match was found. In the empirical work below, we
will document the role of competitive quotes in determining
the probability of finding a match. If an agent submits a quote
that is away from the current market price, that quote likely
goes unfilled. Table 1b and c shows that there were 21,783
market orders, where orders are submitted for immediate
execution at the best available price, and 108,752 limit orders,
where quantity is accompanied by a reservation price which
must be met for the order to be filled.
The newer data sets that are available on foreign exchange
trading simply do not provide the order book detail that is
available in this data set. Only the “top of the book” is
available in other data sets. It is also useful to realize that the
electronic brokerages still retain the same basic features today
as are found in our data set so that the results of this study still
have relevance for today.
Table 3
Intradaily pattern of duration.
Time of day Average duration Number of orders Percentage
0 10.2146 477 0.37%
1 6.7147 692 0.53%
2 10.8359 317 0.24%
3 35.8062 64 0.05%
4 9.0134 200 0.15%
5 5.5536 891 0.68%
6 2.6893 5595 4.29%
7 2.3079 14,491 11.10%
8 2.3178 15,097 11.57%
9 3.0254 9696 7.43%
10 3.2417 7360 5.64%
11 2.1809 13,006 9.96%
12 1.5406 16,790 12.86%
13 1.4885 18,976 14.54%
14 1.5596 14,518 11.12%
15 2.391 6416 4.92%
16 4.7557 2139 1.64%
17 4.8778 1570 1.20%
18 3.1406 1510 1.16%
19 4.6772 446 0.34%
20 6.0416 143 0.11%
21 36.8439 43 0.03%
22 43.329 29 0.02%
23 44.7129 69 0.05%
Duration is the time in minutes between the submission of an order and its
removal from the Reuters electronic brokerage system. Time of day is
measured as GMT (London time) so that 0 GMT is 9:00 in Tokyo and 19:00 in
New York. The table shows a strong intradaily pattern where duration and
number of orders is inversely related.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics of electronic brokerage data.
Price Quantity Quantity dealt
a. All submitted orders
Number of orders 130,535 130,535 130,535
Mean 1.75144 2.283058 0.883633
Std deviation 0.0163 3.58977 1.33644
Skewness 85.55836 165.25713 3.224573
Kurtosis 9189.8112 45,537.8361 22.7082
b. Market orders
Number of orders 21,783 21,783 21,783
Mean 1.75145 3.236285 1.82132856
Std deviation 0.00728 3.6032 1.35002
Skewness 0.4863 3.15407 3.0855
Kurtosis 0.79639 11.98166 17.6065
c. Limit orders
Number of orders 108,752 108,752 108,752
Mean 1.75144 2.09213 0.6958
Std deviation 0.001756 3.55651 1.2519
Skewness 82.159 203.3116 3.7792
Kurtosis 8192.8236 56,773.65 30.4539
d. Orders with quantity dealt greater than 0 (successful orders)
Number of orders 63,517 63,517 63,517
Mean 1.751419 2.468457 1.815971
Std deviation 0.00731 2.63731 1.40623
Skewness 0.4797 4.02832 3.66975
Kurtosis 0.81644 23.2899 27.3741
e. Orders with 0 quantity dealt (withdrawn orders)
Number of orders 67,018 67,018 67,018
Mean 1.751467 2.107344 0
Std deviation 0.02161 4.29469 0
Skewness 71.5303 187.17077 0
Kurtosis 5769.4977 43,324.7019 0
The tables provide summary data from the Reuters D-2002 electronic
brokerage system for the week of October 6e10, 1997. Price is marks per
dollar and quantity is millions of dollars.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics for duration.
All limit
orders
All market
orders
All canceled
orders
Estimations
sample
Number of orders 108,683 21,783 66,517 29,740
Mean (min) 2.855 0.0012 3.5742 1.2631
Std deviation 16.334 0.0008 18.742 4.90
Range 802.67 0.0503 690.182 79.603
Skewness 15.956 14.269 13.374 8.169
Kurtosis 373.711 689.002 252.610 82.1344
Duration is the time passing from the entry of an order until its removal. Order
removal may be due to an order being filled or else canceled. The units of
measurement are in minutes. The sample used for estimation includes only
filled limit orders.
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3.2.1. b.1. Definition and construction
In order to examine the liquidity of the EB and the effi-
ciency of its operation, we construct a variable (Duration),
which measures the time from the entry of an order until its
removal. Since Duration is computed as the time difference
between the entry time and the removal time of an order, it
provides a direct measure of the delay in a transaction on
the EB.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on Duration. We
break down the sample into different categories, for example,
limit orders, market orders, canceled orders, and the sample of
limit orders used for estimation. Comparing all limit orders to
all market orders, the noteworthy difference is the speed with
which market orders are executed. The average limit order
duration is 2.855 min while the average market order duration
is 0.0012 min. Since market orders are executed at the best
available price, they are essentially executed immediately.
However limit orders may sit in the order book for prolonged
times and may be canceled at any time. Note that the mean
duration for canceled orders is 3.5742 min. Some orders are
canceled in seconds after submission while others sit in the
order book for hours before cancellation.As will be discussed below, there is a pronounced intradaily
pattern of activity in the Reuters EB. As a result, we focus on
the active period of 8:00 to 17:00 London time. The data are
then filtered to identify any extreme observations that would
be unrepresentative of the market and would bias the analysis.
We deleted any observations with a duration exceeding 80 min
(61 observations). This leaves a sample of 29,740 orders with
a mean duration of 1.2631 min. This is the data set used for
estimation.3.2.2. b.2. Time of day effect
As with all financial markets, we expect an intradaily
pattern of duration time as markets tend to be deeper at certain
Table 4
Autocorrelations of average duration time.
  Lag    Covariance    Correlation    -1 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1      Std Error 
    0      1636.742        1.00000   |                    |********************|             0 
    1       519.214        0.31722    |                  . |******                            |       0.046676 
    2       353.370        0.21590    |                  . |****                                |      0.051158 
    3       159.369        0.09737    |                  . |**                                    |      0.053106 
    4       282.972        0.17289    |                  . |***                                  |      0.053493 
    5       256.431        0.15667    |                  . |***                                  |      0.054697 
    6     63.954672      0.03907    |                  . |*.                                     |      0.055666 
    7       102.902        0.06287    |                  . |*.                                     |      0.055726 
    8     78.666688      0.04806    |                  . |*.                                     |      0.055880 
    9     39.260038      0.02399    |                  . | .                                      |      0.055970 
   10      6.685793      0.00408    |                  . | .                                      |      0.055993 
   11    -11.446203     -.00699    |                  . | .                                      |      0.055993 
   12      9.795678      0.00598    |                  . | .                                      |      0.055995 
   13      9.432072      0.00576    |                  . | .                                      |      0.055997 
   14     69.653841     0.04256    |                  . |*.                                     |      0.055998 
   15     35.423853     0.02164    |                  . | .                                      |      0.056068 
   16     18.549567     0.01133    |                  . | .                                      |      0.056087 
   17       130.523       0.07975    |                  . |**                                    |      0.056092 
   18     66.945660     0.04090    |                  . |*.                                     |      0.056338 
   19     72.659411     0.04439    |                  . |*.                                     |      0.056403 
   20      0.755464      0.00046    |                  . | .                                      |      0.056479 
   21     10.467460     0.00640    |                  . | .                                      |      0.056479 
   22     -7.547603      -.00461    |                  . | .                                      |      0.056480 
   23    -41.758172     -.02551    |                  .*| .                                     |      0.056481 
   24    -36.516871     -.02231    |                  . | .                                      |      0.056506 
Duration times from order submission to order removal were averaged over 15 minute intervals over the 
24-hour day.  Autocorrelation coefficients were then estimated over this data set. The autocorrelation 
coefficients and associated standard errors reported below confirm the presence of duration clustering 
through time where periods of relatively long durations exist and then are followed by periods of relatively 
short durations. 
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we average duration of the offers submitted to the network for
each hour of the trading day over the five days in our sample.
Table 3 reports the 24 average duration times and the number
of orders submitted for each hour of the day. Traders have to
wait longer on the network when the trading activity is low, as
during hours 21:00 GMT, when North American trading has
stopped and major Asian trading has not yet begun. Note the
very low level of orders submitted during this time and the
relatively long durations. Table 3 also shows the importance of
the Reuters network for mark/dollar trading which is domi-
nated by European and U.S. trading. The market is seen to be
relatively thin during Asian trading hours. This reflects the fact
that, while Hong Kong and Singapore both were active
market-making centers for the mark (and now the euro), the
rival electronic brokerage system offered by EBS is more
popular for Asian trading. In addition, Tokyo trading is
dominated by yen/dollar relative to any other currency pair.7 In
contrast to the thin market during Asian trading hours, note the7 A discussion of Asian trading practices in foreign exchange is provided in
Ito, Lyons, and Melvin (1998) and Covrig and Melvin (2002).depth of the market and associated short duration time during
the peak European trading times from 8:00e17:00 GMT.3.2.3. b.3. Autoregressive structure of duration time
The data suggest that there is a clustering of duration over
time. This will surely be affected by the regular intradaily
patterns, as well as any idiosyncratic patterns that emerge due
to shocks. Long duration time tends to be followed by long
duration and short duration followed by short duration time.
The duration time of an order submitted to the network de-
pends on the willingness of all other traders in the market to
participate by contributing orders. As in the theoretical model
presented earlier, if the market was liquid and the waiting time
was short last period, people would be more likely to go to the
EB this period, given their expectation conditional on past
performance of the EB.
To document the presence of “clustering” in the duration
data, we compute the average duration time of orders submitted
within every 15-min interval. A sample of 459 observations is
constructed from 5 trading days. Autocorrelation coefficients
are computed and the results are reported in Table 4. The sta-
tistics suggest that the duration time is highly autocorrelated
with large and statistically significant coefficients even up to the
fifth order.
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hypotheses regarding duration and the probability of execution
on the EB. We examine the empirical evidence regarding the
following three variables: order size, price competitiveness,
and liquidity. We will discuss hypotheses related to each of
these variables in turn before examining the evidence.
Hypothesis 1: Size effect.
A stylized fact of the foreign exchange market is that large
traders are more likely to use direct dealing than go to the EB.
The intuitive explanation is that, in general, large orders have
to wait longer on the network, which makes electronic trading
riskier and less attractive. However, if the Burr distribution is a
good representation of the foreign exchange market as
Grammig and Maurer (2000) found for the stock market, then
there may be a non-monotonic relationship between duration
and the value of the hazard function. Rather than impose a
particular shape on the hazard function, as is commonly done,
we will specify a flexible function that will allow the data to
identify the shape of the hazard function. It is possible to have
a hazard function that is increasing in duration for small du-
rations and decreasing in duration for large durations, so that
one cannot be sure that large orders have a smaller hazard
value than small orders. For instance, in an order book it could
be the case that market order submission results in a short
duration for limit orders with priority but also reduces the
liquidity in the book so that following a clustering of market
orders and short durations there is a lengthening of the dura-
tion process for newly submitted limit orders as market order
submission slows while the depth of the book is rebuilt. In this
case, the hazard function could be increasing for very short
durations and then fall as the durations lengthen. The evidence
presented here will allow the data to speak to this issue. We
examine the relationship between durations and order size by
incorporating an exogenous variable SIZE in our estimations
below.
Hypothesis 2: Price Impact.
Submission price of a limit order should affect the waiting
time of the order on the EB. In general, we expect that an
order with a competitive submission price, for example, a
relatively high-priced buy order, or a relatively low-priced sell
order, should get filled more quickly than other orders where
price is farther away from the current transaction price of
orders recently filled. This effect is explored by including in
our estimation dummy variables for price competitiveness:
DummyBP, switches to one for buy orders with a higher limit
order price than the last transaction price; DummyBN, switches
to one for buy orders with a submitted price lower than the last
transaction price; DummySP, switches to one for sell orders
with a submitted price higher than the last transaction price;
and DummySN, switches to one for sell orders with a sub-
mitted price lower than the last transaction price. Competitive
(uncompetitive) quotes with expected negative (positive) ef-
fects on duration are captured by DummyBP and DummySN
(DummyBN and DummySP).
Hypothesis 3: Liquidity Effect.Duration should be negatively correlated with the total
liquidity or depth of the market. The EB is characterized by a
positive externality: An increase in the network’s submitted
order volume increases its liquidity, benefiting all trades. The
duration should be smaller when the depth is large. There is a
potential offsetting crowding effect of a negative externality
associated with a large number of orders. As Hendershott and
Mendelson (1999) point out, low value orders can compete
with higher value orders on the same side of the market and
there may be a greater chance of smaller orders being
squeezed out of the queue. However the crowding effect can
only dominate the liquidity effect after the EB becomes suf-
ficiently liquid. We will explore the effect of liquidity by
incorporating a variable LDEPTH, which measures the total
quantity offered for purchase or sale on all active submitted
limit orders. An additional measure of liquidity is a variable
MORDERS, which is the number of market orders submitted
in the period immediately preceding a limit order. As was
discussed above, the effect of market orders on duration could
be positive or negative. Market orders consume liquidity so
that the limit orders with priority should be executed more
quickly as more market orders arrive. However, a clustering of
market orders could result in a perceived reduction in liquidity
so that such a period is followed by a drop in market order
submission and an increase in duration of limit orders as book
depth is rebuilt. The empirical results will shed light on which
effect appears dominant in the data.
3.3.1. c.1. Econometric methodology: the ACD model
Since we are studying orders submitted in irregular time
intervals, the standard econometric techniques based on fixed
time interval are not appropriate analytical tools. If a short
interval is chosen, there will be many intervals with no new
information and heteroskedasticity will be introduced. On the
other hand, the microstructure of the data will be lost if a long
time interval is picked. Engle and Russell (1998) developed an
autoregressive conditional duration (ACD) model to describe
the point process of order arrival rates that is a natural
approach to estimating the relationships of concern here.
The ACD model belongs to the family of self-exciting
marked point processes of Cox and Lewis (1966). A point
process is described as self-exciting when the past evolution
impacts the probability of future events. Basically, the economic
motivation behind the ACD and the ARCH model follows a
similar logic: due to a clustering of news, financial market
events occur in clusters. This implies that the waiting time be-
tween these events exhibits significant serial correlation.
Engle and Russell (1998) proposed the standard exponen-
tial ACD (EACD) model by specifying the observed duration
xi as a mixing process xi ¼ jiεi. The conditional duration ji is
defined as ji ¼ Eðxij:xi1;.; x1Þ and εi is an IID error
sequence. For the EACD model, the density of error εi is
assumed to be exponential.
A conditional density gives the forecast density for the next
observation of order arrival conditional on all available past
information (all past duration times). Given the current in-
formation set, the conditional hazard function measures the
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Fig. 1. Representative hazard functions. The figure illustrates two alternative
hazard functions derived from the general Burr distribution. The
monotonically-decreasing function is parameterized to illustrate the Weibull
hazard, which is nested in the Burr distribution, with k ¼ 0:5 and s2 ¼ 0. The
humped-shaped hazard occurs for Burr distributions with k > 1. The figure
depicts a Burr with k ¼ 2 and s2 ¼ 0:5. Note that, depending on the pa-
rameters, the Burr hazard may be increasing in duration for small durations
and decreasing in duration for larger durations.
8 We acknowledge the generosity of Joachim Grammig in sharing his suite
of ACD GAUSS programs, which greatly shortened the time spent in pro-
gramming for the current study.
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that they last at least until t. Then for an EACD model, the
Conditional Density of xi is
f ðxijxi1;.; x1Þ ¼ 1
ji
exp

 xi
ji

ð1Þ
and the conditional hazard is
hðxijxi1;.; x1Þ ¼ 1
ji
: ð2Þ
In an ACD model, the conditional expectation is a linear
function of the previous duration and conditional expectation.
A simple EACD (1,1) is specified as
ji ¼ uþ axi1þ bji1: ð3Þ
This equation has coefficient constraintsu> 0, b 0, a 0,
and aþ b< 1. The first three constraints ensure the positivity of
the conditional durations and the last ensures the existence of
the unconditional mean of the durations. As will be discussed
below, when additional explanatory variables are added to the
model, the non-negativity constraints may be overly restrictive.
For this reason, we will specify and estimate a log-ACD model
below. First we will discuss implications of the particular
distributional assumption made for the error term.
For EACD models, the hazard functions conditional on past
duration are restricted to be a constant. The Weibull distri-
bution is more flexible in that it nests the exponential and
allows a non-flat hazard function hðxij:xi1;.; x1Þ ¼ xg1i g
However, the hazard function is monotone: increasing if
g > 1, decreasing if g < 1. As pointed out above, it is possible
that the hazard function of financial transactions may be
increasing for small durations and decreasing for long dura-
tions. The misspecification of the conditional hazard function
can severely impact the estimation results. To avoid such
problems, the Burr-distribution is proposed. This allows a
hump shaped hazard and nests the Weibull distribution as a
particular case. The Burr-distribution may be described by first
defining
f ðjiÞ ¼ xi ¼ ji$
ðs2Þð1þ1kÞ$G 1
s2
þ 1
G

1þ 1
k

$G

1
s2
 1
k
 ; ð4Þ
where k and s2 are parameters, 0 < s2 < k and G represents
the gamma function. Then the conditional density is a Burr
density
f ðxijxi1; :::; x1;qÞ ¼ k$x
k
i $x
k1
i
1þ s2$xki $xki
 1
s2

þ1
; ð5Þ
and the conditional hazard function is
hðxijxi1;.; x1;qÞ ¼ k$x
k
i $x
k1
i
1þ s2$xki $xki
: ð6Þ
For s2/0, the Burr-ACD reduces to the Weibull-ACD and
if in addition k ¼ 1, it becomes the exponential-ACD. Since
the Burr-ACD nests the Weibull and exponentialspecifications, by estimating the Burr model, we can test
which specification is supported by the results.8
Fig. 1 illustrates the shape of the hazard function for some
alternative parameters. The monotonic function is parameter-
ized as the Weibull with k ¼ 0:5 and s2 ¼ 0. The hump-shaped
hazard is a Burr with k¼ 2 and s2¼ 0:5. In general, for k> 1 the
Burr hazard has the hump-shape. Such hazard functions have
the hazard increasing in small durations and decreasing in large
durations. Given the possibility of such a hazard for trade on the
EB, it is not possible to state, a priori, that large orders will have
a smaller hazard than small orders. So even if large and small
traders face the same hazard functions, the incidence of ex-
pected trades for large orders in the next time period could,
theoretically, be smaller or larger than that for small orders. Our
empirical work below will yield evidence on this issue.
As mentioned above, in order to test hypotheses suggested
by our theoretical model, we want to include variables such as
order size, price competitiveness, and market depth as
explanatory variables in the conditional duration equation.
When additional variables with negative coefficients are added
linearly to the right-hand side of the equation, conditional
duration ji may become negative which is not admissible. If
working with a standard ACD specification, we would have to
impose non-negativity constraints on the coefficients of the
variables so that the right-hand side of the ACD equation re-
mains strictly positive. Since non-negativity constraints on the
coefficients may be very restrictive, we work instead with a
more flexible functional form provided by the log-ACD model
as discussed by Bauwens and Giot (2000).
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process xi ¼ expðjiÞεi, such that ji is the logarithm of the
conditional duration. εi is the same random variable as in the
ACD model and we specify it as having a Burr distribution.
The specification of the basic Log-ACD (1,1) model is:
ji ¼ uþ a lnðxi1Þ þ bji1: ð7Þ
With this specification, the only coefficient restriction is
that jaþ bj < 1 for covariance stationarity of lnðxiÞ. Estima-
tion proceeds via maximum likelihood.
3.3.2. c.2. Censoring
The data include orders that are completely filled and those
that are only partially filled or canceled. Estimation using only
the completely filled orders may result in a censoring bias due
to the termination of the other orders prior to their full
execution. Let ci denote an observation being completely fil-
led, ci ¼ 1, or censored, ci ¼ 0. If the pairs ðxi; ciÞ are sta-
tistically independent, then the likelihood function for the
sample of data may be written as:
Yn
i¼1
f ðxi;XiÞcigðxi;XiÞ1ci ¼
Y
F
f ðxi;XiÞ
Y
C
gðxi;XiÞ ð8Þ
where
Q
F
and
Q
C
denote products taken over filled and
censored orders, respectively, and X denotes the explanatory
variables on which duration is conditioned. The independence
assumption allows for the censoring mechanism to be related
to past duration or the vector of variables contained in X. But
at the time the order is submitted, the censoring decision
(which is made later) is independent of the conditional
duration or the likelihood that the order is executed.9 We
estimate the model parameters using the likelihood function as
given in equation (13).
3.3.3. c.3 Estimation results
Estimation is based on limit orders. The issue of duration
for market orders is irrelevant since market orders get
executed almost immediately after they are posted on the EB.
As shown in Table 2, the mean duration for market orders is
0.0012 min, which is very small compared to the mean for
filled limit orders of 1.7886 min. As discussed in the prior
section, we estimate the parameters of the model for both
filled limit orders and censored orders as manifested in
canceled orders. If only the filled orders were used, biased
estimates may give us inaccurate information on model pa-
rameters related to the distribution of duration time. Finally, to
avoid the problem of spurious results driven by thin trading
periods, we estimate using data over the period of peak Eu-
ropean business hours (8:00ame5:00pm GMT).109 See Lo, MacKinlay, and Zhang (2002) for a discussion of censoring in a
limit-order setting.
10 No “overnight” durations are utilized. We start each day with the duration
from the first order after 8:00 GMT as our first available lag for that day.As stated above, we seek to estimate ACD models which
incorporate the following variables: SIZE (the quantity sub-
mitted in millions of dollars), dummy variables for competi-
tiveness of submitted order (submission price e last
transaction price), LDEPTH (total depth of the order book in
millions of dollars), and MDEPTH, the number of market
orders submitted over the prior 5 min preceding each limit
order.
Before proceeding to the results, some discussion of the
price competitiveness dummies is in order. To determine the
competitiveness of the submission price, we identify the
transaction price of the last trade before each order is sub-
mitted and take the difference between the submission price
and the last-trade transaction price. To avoid the bid-ask
bounce, the trade must be of the same type as the submitted
order. So for a buy limit order, the last transaction for a buy-
order is found and the price difference between the submission
price and the transaction price is computed. If the submission
price is higher than the transaction price, we consider it a
competitive order and expect it to get filled more quickly. By
the same token, for a sell order, the submission price of a
competitive order would be lower than the transaction price of
the last filled sell-order. We constructed 4 dummy variables in
order to capture the impact of price competitiveness on
duration time: Define variable Pricediff ¼ submission price e
last transaction price, then
DummyBP ¼ 1 for buy orders with Pricediff > 0;
0 otherwise
DummyBN ¼ 1 for buy orders with Pricediff < 0;
0 otherwise
DummySP ¼ 1 for sell orders with Pricediff > 0;
0 otherwise
DummySN ¼ 1 for sell orders with Pricediff < 0;
0 otherwise.
The functional form of the Burr-log-ACD (1,1) model
estimated is:
ji ¼ uþ a lnðxi1Þ þ bji1þ d1SIZEiþ d2DummyBPi
þd3DummyBNiþ d3DummySPiþ d4DummySNi
þd5LDEPTHiþ d6MDEPTHi
ð9Þ
where i indexes submitted orders and orders are arranged in
calendar (clock) time. Note that there is no collinearity
problem associated with including the four dummies for price
competitiveness of quotes since about 30 percent of submitted
orders have quotes equal to the last transaction price. Pre-
liminary estimates indicated that one could not reject the hy-
pothesis of equality of coefficients for the dummy variables for
competitive bid and ask quotes and uncompetitive bid and ask
quotes. As a result, we constrain the coefficients for each
pair to be equal to reduce the number of coefficients to be
estimated.
Estimates of the model are reported in Table 5. The esti-
mation procedure employs the joint likelihood function for
filled and unfilled orders as in equation (8). Estimates of the
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Fig. 2. Shape of estimated hazard function. The figure illustrates a hazard
function with parameters equal to those estimated for the foreign exchange
electronic brokerage data. The conditional hazard function is generated by a
Burr distribution with k ¼ 0:6379 and s2 ¼ 0:4652. Note that the hazard
function is monotonically decreasing in duration, so that the longer the
duration, the smaller the value of the hazard function. If large orders are
associated with longer duration, then the associated value of the hazard
function should be lower for large orders than small orders.
Table 5
ACD Models of duration: estimates.
Coefficient Std. error T-Stat Prob
a. Filled orders
SIZE 0.0663 0.0094 7.051 0.0000
DummyBPi 1.0542 0.0347 30.414 0.0000
DummyBNi 1.9840 0.0331 60.026 0.0000
DummySPi 1.9840 0.0331 60.026 0.0000
DummySNi 1.0542 0.0347 30.414 0.0000
LDEPTH 0.0023 0.0004 5.559 0.0000
MDEPTH 0.0073 0.0004 16.551 0.0000
b. Canceled orders
SIZE 0.0490 0.0007 67.583 0.0000
DummyBPi 0.3329 0.0371 8.965 0.0000
DummyBNi 1.4740 0.0374 39.417 0.0000
DummySPi 1.4740 0.0374 39.417 0.0000
DummySNi 0.3329 0.0371 8.965 0.0000
LDEPTH 0.0127 0.0064 1.990 0.0466
MDEPTH 0.0054 0.0004 13.151 0.0000
Maximum likelihood estimates of Burr-log-ACD models of duration from time
orders submitted until time orders are filled or canceled are presented below.
Joint estimation for filled orders and canceled orders addresses the censoring
problem associated with the latter.
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expected, we get a positive significant coefficient for SIZE.
This suggests that the bigger the order, the longer the duration
time. In terms of economic significance, a simulation analysis
using the estimated model suggests that a $1 million increase
in size, results in an average increase in duration of about 11 s.
In the theory review of section 2, the finding of smaller trades
being routed to the EB would be consistent with several mo-
tivations such as big players having a greater demand for
immediacy due to their having a higher discount rate than
small players or their having an informational advantage over
small players so that the value they place on a quick match
exceeds that of smaller agents. As discussed in the method-
ology section, the effect of SIZE is uncertain due to the pos-
sibility of a hump-shaped hazard function. However, the
empirical results indicate that size of trade is a reason to
expect big traders to prefer the dealer market over the EB.
While not reported in the table, the shape and scale parameters
associated with the Burr distribution are constrained to be
equal for both the filled and censored samples. The estimated
parameters of k ¼ 0:6379 and s2 ¼ 0:4652 suggest that the
appropriate hazard function for the electronic foreign ex-
change brokerage will have a shape like that portrayed in
Fig. 2. For these data, the hazard is monotonically decreasing
in duration. The empirical results for filled orders suggest no
ambiguity in the effect of SIZE on the value of the hazard
function.
Both measures of market depth, LDEPTH and MDEPTH,
have negative and statistically significant coefficients in part a)
of Table 5. So the greater the quantity of outstanding orders,
the shorter the duration time and the more market orders that
were submitted prior to a limit order, the shorter the duration
of the limit order. A simulation analysis using the model es-
timates suggests that if LDEPTH, the total depth of the order
book, increases by $10 million, duration falls by about 4 s. IfMDEPTH, the number of market orders submitted in the prior
5 min period, increases by 10 more orders, duration falls by
about 12 s. In the context of the theory discussed in Section 2
above, greater liquidity or depth of the market lowers the
execution risk considered by Foucault and encourages sub-
missions to the EB. Yet for a particular limit order, a deeper
book on the same side of the market could result in a longer
duration. Depth of the order book is one side of the liquidity
concept where, other things equal, a deeper book encourages
market orders and lowers execution risk for limit orders so that
there is a greater likelihood of finding a match in a shorter
time. Market orders are another side of liquidity as market
orders consume liquidity. The more market orders arriving on
the other side of the book from a particular limit order, the
greater the probability of execution for that limit order.
With regard to our price impact variables, results for the four
dummies are also consistent with our priors. The negative co-
efficients ofDummyBP andDummySN indicate that it takes less
time to find a match for a limit order with a competitive price (a
better price than the last transaction price). Asmentioned above,
simulation results suggest that increasing order size by $1
million, results in an increase in duration of about 11 s. For
competitively priced orders, simulation analysis indicates that
the duration increase is only 3 s. On the other hand, for buy
orders with low prices and sell orders with high prices (relative
to last transactions), the results suggest longer durations as
indicated by the positive and significant coefficients estimated
for DummyBN and DummySP. Simulation analysis indicates
that an increase in order size of $1million will increase duration
by about 59 s for uncompetitive-priced orders. Without condi-
tioning the estimation results on price competitiveness of
quotes, one cannot properly infer the effects of other variables,
like SIZE and LDEPTH. Our results for filled orders may be
summarized as follows: given the price competitiveness of
submitted orders, duration is increasing in order size and
decreasing in market depth or liquidity.
Part b) of Table 5 reports the estimated parameters asso-
ciated with the censored sample of canceled orders. Interesting
differences from the filled order results include a negative size
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depth of the order book. The former indicates that large orders
are more likely to be canceled faster than small orders.
Simulation analysis indicates that a $1 million increase in
order size results in order cancellation about 13 s faster, other
things equal. Perhaps this reflects the more careful manage-
ment of large orders by participants.
With regard to the proper functional form of ACD model,
as mentioned above, the Burr model nests the Weibull and
exponential. Referring back to the specification of the Burr
ACD in Section 3.3.1, we can test whether the Weibull ACD is
supported by a test of s2/0. The results clearly reject the
hypothesis that s2 ¼ 0 (with a p-value of 0.000). Since we
reject the Weibull in favor of the Burr specification, it is clear
that the exponential is not supported (but we would also reject
the additional restriction associated with the exponential, that
is k ¼ 1).
4. Summary
Theoretical models related to the choice of venue for order
placement hold empirically testable implications. We examine
some key implications of order placement choice in the inter-
dealer foreign exchange market where participants face a
choice of trading directly with other dealers or submitting
orders to an electronic brokerage (EB). Theory suggests that
under normal conditions, we would expect large traders to
prefer the direct-dealing market where certainty of quick
execution is provided. A large order may be expected to have a
longer duration on the EB in order to find a match. Smaller
traders would prefer the EB due to lower transaction costs
along with the greater likelihood of finding a match for a small
order. The longer the expected duration of a submitted order,
the lower the expected value from trading. This result is driven
by the potential cost of having the market price move unfa-
vorably and a limit order filled at an undesirable price before
an order can be withdrawn.
Since the execution risk is greater for large orders, the
empirical analysis focuses on estimating duration models of
limit orders submitted to the Reuters D-2000-2 electronic
brokerage system. We model the time from order submission
to order fill (Duration) in an autoregressive conditional dura-
tion (ACD) framework where in addition to lagged conditional
and unconditional duration, we include the size of the order
(SIZE ), the liquidity or depth of the market (DEPTH ), and
price competitiveness of the quote (PRICEDIF ). The latter
variable is measured by the difference between the price of the
submitted order and the last transaction price on the same side
of the market (buy or sell). It is important to condition the
duration results on price competitiveness of quotes in order to
make sensible inferences on other variables, like size of order
submitted. We find that price competitiveness has the effects
expected: uncompetitive quotes, as measured by relatively low
buy prices or relatively high sell prices, are associated with
longer durations while competitive quotes, as measured by
relatively high buy prices or low sell prices are associated with
shorter durations. Given these effects of price competitiveness,we find that the larger the size of order submitted, the longer
the duration. Prior evidence for equity trades indicates that the
hazard function may be increasing in duration for small du-
rations and falling in duration for larger durations. In this case,
we cannot say that large orders will have a lower value of the
hazard function than small orders. However, our evidence
suggests a hazard function that is monotonically decreasing in
duration. So the longer duration, the lower the value of the
hazard function and, in terms of the theory presented, the
lower the value of order submission on the electronic
brokerage. The empirical results support the theoretical model
where big traders will prefer the dealer market over the EB
due to the longer waiting time for big orders to find a match on
the electronic brokerage. We also find that the greater the
depth of the market, the shorter the duration. This is the ex-
pected result, as greater depth should increase the probability
of finding a match for any submitted order.
To our knowledge, this is the first paper to focus on the
choice of trading venue for foreign exchange and it pays due
respect to the stylized facts of the market. The growth of
electronic broking is the number one institutional FX devel-
opment of the last two decades and has revolutionized the way
in which currencies are traded. The popularity of this inno-
vation in trading protocol is associated with lower cost of
transacting and the ability of smaller traders to compete on an
equal footing with the big players in the market via anony-
mous order submission. In the future, if longer data sets
become available, it will be instructive to analyze how trading
migrates between the electronic broking network and the
direct dealing network during times of stress. In such times of
great price uncertainty, a limit order may be “picked off” and
executed at an unfavorable price relative to the fast-moving
current market values. As a result, we expect the electronic
brokerage network to dry up during times of high volatility as
even small traders migrate to the direct dealing market where
immediate execution is offered. Analysis of such volatility
effects awaits the availability of new and longer data sets.Acknowledgment
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